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HE most significant developments in Texas health care law during
the past year (as in most odd-numbered years) came from the leg-
islature, which in 1999 enacted hundreds of health care laws. One
of these, worthy of mention in this Introduction despite the legislature's
intention that the new law should effect no substantive change, is the new
Texas Occupations Code.1 The Code collects and restates, among other
laws, the Medical Practice Act,2 the Physician Assistant Licensing Act, 3
the Dental Practice Act, 4 the Nursing Practice Act,5 and the licensing acts
for optometrists and opticians, speech-language pathologists and audiolo-
gists, psychologists and other therapists and counselors, and pharmacies
and pharmacists, among others.6 The codification will take some getting
used to, but even the mighty Texas Legislature may be unable to force
* Associate Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University School of Law; Of
Counsel, Haynes and Boone, L.L.P., Dallas. I am grateful for the substantial assistance of
Jeffrey P. King, Esq., Haynes and Boone, L.L.P.; Robert L. Fine, M.D.; Cathy Meacham,
Esq., Tenet Healthcare System in Dallas; and Michelle Hartmann and Natalie Terhune,
both of the SMU School of Law Class of 2001.
1. TEx. Occ. CODE (West Supp. 2000). Section 1.001(a) of the Code states: "This
code is enacted as a part of the state's continuing statutory revision program,... [which]
contemplates a topic-by-topic revision of the state's general and permanent statute law
without substantive change."
2. Id. §§ 151.001-165.001.
3. Id. § 204.001.
4. Id. §§ 251.001-266.001.
5. Id. § 301.001
6. See generally id. title 3.
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attorneys to start calling certified nonprofit health organizations
"162.001(a)'s" after years of assembling (and taking apart) "5.01(a)'s". 7
I. INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
A. ABORTION: PARENTAL NOTIFICATION
During the Survey year, the legislature passed a parental-notice-of-
abortion law, which provides that a physician may not perform an abor-
tion on an unemancipated minor unless the physician provides forty-eight
hours notice to one of her parents or her guardian, subject to certain ex-
ceptions.8 One of these exceptions allows the minor to apply to a court
for an order authorizing her to consent to an abortion. 9 Section 33.003 of
the Texas Family Code permits this "judicial bypass" when the trial court
determines by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) the minor is ma-
ture and sufficiently well informed to make the decision to have an abor-
tion performed without notification to either her parents or her managing
conservator or guardian, (2) notification would not be in the best interest
of the minor, or (3) notification may lead to physical, sexual, or emotional
abuse of the minor.10 Pursuant to the statute, the Texas Supreme Court
promulgated "Texas Parental Notification Rules and Forms,"" effective
January 1, 2000, to help ensure that the bypass proceeding is conducted in
a confidential and expeditious manner.'2 The statute also produced a se-
ries of "In re Jane Doe" decisions in which the supreme court interpreted
the bypass provisions. These were the court's first-ever forays into the
abortion arena, and the results were predictably divisive.
In In re Doe,13 the first case on the parental-notification law, the su-
preme court addressed the issue of whether a 17-year-old girl seeking a
judicial bypass of the parental notification requirement had demonstrated
that she was "mature and sufficiently well informed" to make the deci-
sion on her own to have an abortion. The trial court denied her applica-
tion based upon the "sufficiently well informed" standard and the court
of appeals affirmed. In a plurality opinion, the court concluded that the
minor did not meet the standard, but nonetheless remanded the case for
further proceedings "in the interest of. justice."' 14 Relying on United
States Supreme Court decisions as well as other states with similar notifi-
7. Compare id. § 162.001(a) with Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4495b, § 5.01(a) (West.
Supp. 1999).
8.. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 33.002(a) (West Supp. 2000) (effective September 1, 1999).
9. See id. § 33.003.
10. See id. § 33.003 (i).
11. Texas Parental Notification Rules and Forms, Tex. Sup. Ct., available at http://
www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/rules/pnr/index.htm.
12. See 76th Leg., ch. 395, § 2, 1999 Tex. Gen. Laws 2466 ("The Supreme Court of
Texas shall issue promptly such rules as may be necessary in order that the process estab-
lished by Sections 33.003 and 33.004, Family Code, as added by this Act, may be conducted
in a manner that will ensure confidentiality and sufficient precedence over all other pend-
ing matters to ensure promptness of disposition.").
13. 19 S.W.3d 249 (Tex. 2000).
14. See id. at 257.
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cation statutes, the court held that a minor is mature and sufficiently well
informed "when the evidence demonstrates that the minor is capable of
reasoned decision-making and that her decision is not the product of im-
pulse, but is based upon careful consideration of the various options
available to her and the benefits, risks, and consequences of those op-
tions. '' 15 This standard requires three showings by a minor seeking judi-
cial bypass.16 First, she must show that she has obtained information
from a health-care provider about the health risks associated with an
abortion and that she understands those risks, including the risks associ-
ated with the particular stage of her pregnancy. Second, she must show
that she understands the alternatives to abortion and their implications,
including both adoption and keeping the child. Finally, she must demon-
strate that she is aware of the emotional and psychological aspects of un-
dergoing an abortion. This showing requires the minor to show that she
has considered how her decision might affect her family relations. Al-
though it does not require her to obtain information from licensed, pro-
fessional counselors, she must demonstrate that she received the
information from "reliable and informed sources. '17 On the question of
maturity, "the [trial] court should make specific findings concerning its
determination so that there can be meaningful review on appeal."' 8
Although seven justices agreed to remand the case for further proceed-
ings, only five justices agreed on the standard of review, holding that ap-
pellate courts should apply the "legal and factual sufficiency" review
standard rather than an "abuse of discretion" standard in reviewing trial
court rulings. 19 Justice Hecht (joined by Justice Abbott) dissented, criti-
cizing the court for authorizing judges to bypass parental notification
where a minor has provided minimal information and has shown no ap-
preciation for the important family, social, moral, or religious issues in-
volved.20 He also accused the court of "trivializing" the abortion decision
and dealing "a heavy blow to parents' fundamental, constitutional rights
to raise their children, rights the Legislature had absolutely every inten-
tion of protecting by passing the Parental Notification Act in 1999."21
Finally, although Justice Owen agreed to remand the case, she would also
have required a "more substantive showing" from a minor seeking judi-
cial bypass.22
After remand, the trial court denied Doe's application on the ground
that she did not satisfy the second element of the sufficiently well in-
formed standard, concluding that Doe had not thoughtfully considered
her alternatives because she did not understand the intrinsic benefits of
15. Id. at 255.
16. See id. at 256-57.
17. Id. at 257.
18. Id.
19. In re Doe, 19 S.W.3d at 253.
20. See id. at 267.
21. Id. at 266-67.
22. Id. at 260.
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keeping the child or adoption. The court of appeals affirmed, but the
supreme court determined that Doe conclusively established the statu-
tory requirements and that she was entitled to bypass parental notifica-
tion.23 First, the court noted that although a minor must demonstrate
that she considered the "benefits, risks, and consequences" of the various
options, its first decision does not require the minor to mechanically list
or recite the potential benefits of her options.24 Rather, "the focus of the
inquiry is whether [she] has thoughtfully considered her alternatives. '25
Moreover, even though there may exist generally recognized benefits to
an abortion alternative, those benefits must be considered in lights of the
minor's particular situation.26 In this case, Doe received information
about her alternatives from several different sources, read books and did
research on the Internet about her alternatives, spoke for more than an
hour and a half, on two different occasions, with a counselor, and spoke
to several people who had been in a similar situation.27 In addition, the
record reflected that she gave reasoned answers in response to the ques-
tions about her options. Thus, Doe demonstrated that she understood
the alternatives to abortion as they applied to her and she thoughtfully
considered their implications.2 8 Justices Hecht, Owen, and Abbott dis-
sented from the court's ruling, illustrating a pattern of division among the
justices that repeats itself throughout most of the Jane Doe opinions.
The second parental notification case, In re Doe 2,29 addressed the
"best interests" and "potential abuse" standards. The court held that the
standard of review for a determination that notification would not be in
the best interests of the minor should be abuse of discretion.30 After not-
ing that "the trial court should weigh the advantages and disadvantages of
parental notification in the minor's specific situation," 31 the court pro-
vided a list of "non-exhaustive factors" for determining a minor's best
interests: (1) the minor's emotional or physical needs, (2) the possibility
of emotional or physical danger to the minor, (3) the stability of the mi-
nor's home and whether notification would cause serious and lasting
harm to the family structure, (4) the relationship between the parent and
the minor and the effect of notification on that relationship, and (5)
whether notification may lead the parents to withdraw emotional and fi-
nancial support from the minor.32 Although the trial court should con-
sider "all relevant circumstances" surrounding the minor in question, her
"generalized fear of telling her parents does not, by itself, establish that
23. See In re Doe, 19 S.W.3d 346 (Tex. 2000).
24. Id. at 359.
25. Id.
26. See id.
27. Id. at 359-60.
28. See id. at 360.
29. 19 S.W.3d 278 (Tex. 2000).
30. See id. at 281-82.




notification would not be in [her] best interests. ' 33 Finally, as with the
maturity determination, the trial court must make specific findings. 34
Regarding the "potential for abuse" standard, the trial court found no
evidence that notification may lead to abuse.35 The supreme court re-
viewed the trial court's finding for legal sufficiency and concluded that
the record did not support the trial court's finding, in light of Doe's state-
ments that she was afraid of her father, that he had a temper, and that he
had slapped her, but never beat her.36 The court accordingly vacated the
trial court's ruling and remanded the case due to changes in the law. Ac-
cusing the court of "distorting its jurisprudence" 37 with "an interest in
achieving a particular result"38 through this holding, Justice Hecht (again
joined by Justice Abbott) dissented. Justice Owen agreed with the dis-
sent that the court's appellate-review standard was too low 39 but agreed
to remand the case because the court had not previously addressed the
best interest aspect of the judicial bypass provision.40
Less than a week after Doe 2, the court issued opinions in In re Doe
3,41 on appeal from a trial court's denial of an application for judicial
bypass. In a per curiam opinion, the court addressed the "sufficiently
well informed" and "abuse of discretion" standards, ultimately vacating
the trial court's order and remanding the case in the interest of justice.42
In a concurring opinion, Justice Gonzales (joined by Chief Justice Phillips
and by Justice Owen in part) addressed the standard for proving the po-
tential for emotional abuse. Looking to the definition of "abuse" in
Chapter 261 of the Family Code, he concluded that "emotional abuse
contemplates unreasonable conduct causing serious emotional injury. '43
Although evidence of prior physical or emotional abuse that caused the
minor to become severely depressed or self-destructive, if causally linked
to notification, would likely establish this ground, mere evidence that she
would be upset or have short-term feelings of guilt or anxiety would not
meet the standard.44 In this case, Doe testified that her father was an
alcoholic who had been physically abusive with her mother and would
likely take out disapproval of the minor's situation on her mother. She
also testified that she believed she would be subject to emotional abuse if
she had to tell her parents. Because this evidence did not conclusively
establish that Doe would suffer emotional abuse, it failed to meet the
33. Id.
34. See id.
35. See In re Doe 2, 19 S.W.3d at 283.
36. See id.
37. Id. at 295.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 285.
40. See id. at 290.
41. 19 S.W.3d 300 (Tex. 2000).
42. See id. at 301.
43. Id. at 303-04. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 261.001 ("Investigation of Report of Child
Abuse of Neglect").
44. See id. at 304.
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potential for abuse standard as a matter of law.45
Although Justices Enoch, Baker, Hankinson, and O'Neill all agreed
with the decision to set aside the court of appeals' judgment, they would
have concluded that Doe proved emotional abuse as a matter of law and
rendered judgment for Doe.46 Because the legislature balanced the soci-
etal interest in having parents guide the decisions of their children with
the equally strong societal interest in prohibiting child abuse, these jus-
tices rejected the notion that the courts should "differentiate among the
perceived degrees or types of abuse that may occur or to consider
whether the abuse would occur anyway so that one more instance doesn't
matter. '47 Accordingly, Doe met the potential for abuse standard in this
case, where there was "at least some evidence that notification 'may lead
to ... emotional abuse of the minor."48
Finally, Justices Hecht, Owen, and Abbott wrote separate dissents,
agreeing that Doe had failed to establish the emotional abuse standard as
a matter of law and that the court should affirm the court of appeals. 49
All three justices adopted the definition of "abuse" from Chapter 261 of
the Family Code, which includes "mental or emotional injury to a child
that results in an observable and material impairment in the child's
growth, development, or psychological functioning." 50
In In Re Jane Doe 4,51 the supreme court once again vacated and re-
manded a trial court order denying an application for judicial bypass.
The high court found no legal error in the ruling, but it wanted to give the
trial court the benefit of the Doe 1 and Doe 2 opinions, which set forth
the controlling legal standards in the case.52 The court further elaborated
on the "best interests" standard, holding that "[a]s a matter of law, the
minor's emotional well being, the family structure, and the parent-child
relationship would be adversely affected if her parents withdrew support
and severed all contact with her."'53 Thus, if a minor presents uncontro-
verted testimony to this effect that is "clear, positive, and direct," and not
impeached or discredited by other circumstances, the trial court would
have to accept it as fact and would abuse its discretion if it denied the
minor's application. '54
After remand, the trial court again denied the minor's application. On
appeal, the supreme court held that she failed as a matter of law to estab-
lish that she was mature and sufficiently well informed to have an abor-
tion without notifying her parents. 55 Justice Hankinson, writing the
45. See id. at 304-05.
46. See id. at 306-09.
47. In re Doe 3, 19 S.W.3d at 307.
48. Id. at 308 (emphasis added).
49. See id. at 309-22.
50. See TEx. FAM. COE § 261.001(1)(A).
51. 19 S.W.3d 322 (Tex. 2000).
52. See id. at 326-27.
53. Id. at 325.
54. Id.
55. See In re Doe 4,19 S.W.3d 337 (Tex. 2000).
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opinion for seven members of the court, addressed only the first of the
three requirements necessary to meet her burden, that she has obtained
information from a health-care provider about the health risks associated
with abortion and that she understands those risks. Doe testified that a
past medical problem would force her to undergo a different type of
abortion procedure resulting in different risks, but she was unable to ex-
plain how the procedures and risks were different, "demonstrating a lack
of comprehension about the specific risks of the procedure to her."56
Thus, although Doe spoke to a doctor about abortion, she failed to
demonstrate as a matter of law that she understood the risks of having
the abortion, and the trial judge could have reasonably found that she
was not sufficiently well informed.57
The court also addressed the "best interests" exception. Doe offered
two reasons why it would not be in her best interest to notify her parents:
her medical record and her parents' reaction to her older sister's preg-
nancy.58 The court first explained that while her medical history "may be
probative of why an abortion may be in her best interests, the statute
requires her to prove ... that notifying her parents would not be in her
best interests. '59 If such health risks exist, then potential health needs
and dangers to her health may in fact weigh in favor of notifying her
parents.60 Doe also testified that notifying her parents could harm their
family structure and lead her parents to withdraw support. Specifically,
she stated that when her sister was pregnant years earlier, her parents
immediately ordered her to leave the home even though the sister was
still a minor. She also stated that the parents have not spoken to the
sister since. Thus, although some evidence weighed in favor of parental
notification, if the trial court determined that the potential physical dan-
ger to Doe outweighed any potential disruption to Doe's family relation-
ship, it did not abuse its discretion in finding that a judicial bypass was not
in Doe's best interests. 61
B. ADVANCE DIRECTIVES
Between 1977 and 1995, the legislature enacted three advance-directive
laws for end-of-life treatment decisions in Texas. In 1977, Texas recog-
nized "living wills" (called "directives to physicians" in the Texas Natural
Death Act62), followed by the "durable power of attorney for health
care" ("DPAHC") in 198963 and the "out-of-hospital do-not-resuscitate
56. Id. at 339.
57. See id.
58. See id. at 340.
59. Id.
60. See id.
61. See In re Doe 4, 19 S.W.3d at 340.
62. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 672.004 (1992), repealed by Acts 1999, 76th
Leg., ch. 450, § 1.03.
63. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 135.001 (1997), repealed by Acts 1999, 76th
Leg. ch. 450, § 1.05.
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["DNR"] order" in 1995.64 These advance directives addressed three dis-
tinct situations. The directive to physicians permitted competent patients
to express their nontreatment preferences in the event they were diag-
nosed with a terminal condition (which included, after a 1989 amend-
ment, an irreversible condition) and were no longer competent to make
their own decisions about life-sustaining treatments. The DPAHC did
not convey specific instructions for treatment decisions, as the directive to
physicians did, but it addressed a vastly greater number of treatment situ-
ations. It permitted competent patients to designate an agent to make all
medical decisions on their behalf (not just those that concerned life-sus-
taining treatment) in the event they lost decision making capacity (even if
they did not have a terminal condition). The out-of-hospital DNR order
allowed a physician and a patient who had been diagnosed with a termi-
nal condition to execute an order that would instruct emergency medical
personnel and other health care professionals to withhold CPR in the
event of cardiac or respiratory arrest outside an acute-care hospital.
Experience with the various advance directives over a number of years,
as well as the tinkering of successive legislatures, revealed weaknesses in
the laws and introduced inconsistencies among them. An attempt to ad-
dress these problems with a single comprehensive advance directive law
passed both houses in 199765 but was vetoed by the governor. 66 A second
attempt in 1999 was more successful, resulting in a new chapter 166 of the
Health and Safety Code, entitled the "Advance Directives Act."'67 Some
of the more significant changes are noted in the paragraphs that follow.
The old "Directive to Physicians" has been renamed "Directive to Phy-
sicians and Family or Surrogate," 68 a change that broadens the audience
to whom the directive is addressed from physicians alone (under the old
Natural Death Act) now to include family members and other surrogate
decision makers as well. The new statutory form now explicitly states
that no one (other than the patient) may revoke or change the directive,69
in the apparent hope that family members and surrogates will not reject
or challenge the patient's written directive without serious thought. The
form also prefaces its treatment of death and terminal illness with a dis-
cussion of the importance of communication with family members and
personal physicians about the patient's personal values and treatment
preferences. 70 Many small changes in the form are intended to make it a
64. See Tex. Health & Safety Code § 674.001 (1992), repealed by Acts 1999, 7 6'h Leg.,
ch. 450, § 1.04.
65. See Tex. S.B. 414, 76th Leg. (1997).
66. A large and diverse drafting committee was assembled to develop a new law that
would eliminate the inconsistencies among the three existing statutes and fix some of the
problems that had emerged over time. I was a member of that drafting committee, which
met frequently in Austin from 1998 to 1999. The comments in this article reflect my opin-
ions alone and should not be attributed to any other member of the drafting group.
67. See TEX. HEALrH & SAFETY CODE § 166.001 (West Supp. 2000).





more user-friendly document, 71 but perhaps the most significant change
in the form is that it now permits the patient not only to refuse aggressive
treatment in the face of a terminal or irreversible condition, as in the past,
but also to request continued treatment for either or both conditions. 72
Under the old law, the definition of "terminal condition" included not
only conditions in which death was reasonably imminent and unavoidable
but also "irreversible conditions," in which death might be years or de-
cades away, as can be the case with patients in a persistent or permanent
vegetative state. 73 By its very nature, "irreversible condition" seemed
somewhat inconsistent with the notion of "terminal condition," at least in
patients with some prospect for medium- or long-term survival. The Ad-
vance Directive Act separates the concepts of "terminal condition" and
"irreversible condition" and provides separate definitions for each.74 An-
other change in the Advance Directive Act is that the diagnosis of "ter-
minal condition" or "irreversible condition" may now be made by only
one physician, rather than two. 75
Perhaps the most significant change in the new law is the inclusion of a
process for dealing with situations in which physicians and health care
entities are confronted with either "classic right-to-die" or "reverse right-
to-die" dilemmas. In the "classic" situation, the incompetent patient's
family asks that a particular life-sustaining treatment be withheld or dis-
continued and the physician refuses. 76 In the "reverse right-to-die" situa-
tion, the participants switch positions, with the family typically asking
that "everything be done" to keep the patient alive and the physician
71. The new form includes instructions for completing it on the document itself, defini-
tions of key concepts, and explanations and examples that are intended to be understanda-
ble to most lay readers. Id.
72. Id. The new form explicitly offers patients the choice of refusing or requesting
certain treatments through a series of check-off boxes. In the past, a patient who wanted
to express a preference to receive treatments had to write that preference somewhere on
the form; no space was provided for that purpose.
73. See, e.g., The Multi-Society Task Force on PVS, Medical Aspects of the Persistent
Vegetative State (Second of Two Parts), 330 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1572, 1575-76 (1994).
74. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 166.002(9), (13) (West Supp. 2000). In the new
law, the phrase "terminal condition" refers to an incurable condition that is expected to
bring about the patient's death within six months even with the provision of life-sustaining
treatment. See id. § 166.002(13). This definition of "terminal illness" focuses more nar-
rowly than did the old law on cases in which heroic measures are likely to be futile. The
Natural Death Act referred to an incurable condition that is expected to bring about death
without the provision of life-sustaining treatment. See id. § 672.002(9) (1992).
"Irreversible condition," however, is now broadly defined as a condition that is incur-
able, severely debilitating, and-without life-sustaining treatment-fatal. See
id. § 166.002(9) (West Supp. 2000). This newly defined category of "irreversible condi-
tion" potentially includes a large number of conditions-for example, advanced
neurodegenerative diseases (e.g., multiple sclerosis, amyotropic lateral sclerosis, dementia)
and progressive failures of the heart, liver, kidney, and lung.
75. Id. § 166.031(2).
76. This classic form of the right-to-die problem is exemplified by such cases as In re




refusing,77 usually on the ground that initiating or continuing life-sus-
taining interventions would not provide a cognizable benefit to the
patient. 78
Rather than attempt a substantive resolution of such disagreements,
the Advance Directives Act offers a process by which the situation may
be resolved (or, if not resolved, ended), a process that has been endorsed
in broad outline by the American Medical Association's Council on Ethi-
cal and Judicial Affairs. 79 The Act codifies the AMA procedure80 (with
at least one significant variation81 ) and provides a legal "safe harbor" for
institutions that follow the statutory process.82 The process includes a
mandatory ethics consultation, a reasonable attempt to transfer the pa-
tient to another provider, and the continuation of life-sustaining proce-
dures for a minimum of ten days after the ethics committee provides a
written explanation of its review process to the patient's surrogate. 83 Af-
77. Relatively few "reverse right-to-die" cases have been litigated, and with few excep-
tions those that have gone to court have resulted in judgments that supported the family
decision makers. See Paul R. Helft et al., The Rise and Fall of the Futility Movement, 343
NEw ENG. J. MED. 293 (2000).
78. As even this brief description of the problems suggests, the core dispute is usually
not over a diagnosis, prognosis, or the efficacy of a particular treatment. Rather, the disa-
greement is over what constitutes a "benefit" to the patient, and in turn over the value
judgments that underlay the positions of the respective parties and, of course, over whose
value judgments are entitled to precedence.
79. See AMA Council on Ethical & Judicial Affairs, Medical Futility in End-of-Life
Care, 281 JAMA 937 (1999).
80. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 166.046 (West Supp. 2000).
81. See text accompanying note 83 infra.
82. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 166.045(d) (West Supp. 2000) ("A physician,
health professional acting under the direction of a physician, or health care facility is not
civilly or criminally liable or subject to review or disciplinary action by the person's appro-
priate licensing board if the person has complied with the procedures outlined in Section
166.046."). The value of this safe harbor is enhanced by the Advance Directives Act's
changes to the liability provisions of the old Natural Death Act. Under prior law, a physi-
cian was immune from civil and criminal liability for following a directive in good faith and
was equally immune from liability for failing to follow the directive, whether or not the
physician knew of the directive's existence. See id. § 672.016(b) (1992). The Advance Di-
rectives Act eliminates the civil and criminal immunity and adds that the physician is sub-
ject to professional discipline as well. See id. § 166.045(b) (West Supp. 2000).
83. See id. § 166.046. The "ten-day rule" provides a fixed period of time during which a
transfer of the patient can be attempted. It is also a time when discussions with the surro-
gate decision maker (and other significant participants in the decision) should be continued
and interim short-term treatment strategies attempted, if possible. It also provides an ade-
quate window for the surrogate or family to seek judicial review in an orderly manner, see
id. § 166.046(g), which is to say after all reasonable attempts at achieving an agreement
have failed, rather than at the first sign of a disagreement. The Act specifies that the costs
of transferring the patient to a different facility are to be borne by the patient. See id.
§ 166.046(e). On the other hand, the Act displays at least an implicit preference that the
costs of continued treatment during the ten-day period be the responsibility of the insurer
(if any). Section 166.046(f) provides: "Life-sustaining treatment under this section may not
be entered in the patient's medical record as medically unnecessary treatment until [the
ten-day] period ...has expired." Although the intention behind this provision may be
honorable, or at least understandable-i.e., insurers should not be able to escape their
obligation to pay for disputed treatment simply because it has been described in a patient's
chart as "unnecessary," "futile," or "nonbeneficial")-the provision has the unfortunate
effect of directing physicians to render an inaccurate or incomplete medical record. A
conscientious physician who honestly believes that a disputed treatment is unnecessary,
1110 [Vol. 53
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ter ten days of continued treatment, if the disagreement persists and a
transferee physician or entity has not been found, there is no longer an
obligation under the statute to continue the life-sustaining treatment.84
If an institution chooses not to follow this somewhat extended proce-
dure, it will forego the Act's "safe harbor" provision. The statutory alter-
native to the "safe harbor" procedures is simply to continue life-
sustaining treatments until there has been a reasonable opportunity to
transfer the patient to another physician or facility willing to comply with
the directive or the surrogate's treatment decision.8 5
The Advance Directives Act also changes the process for obtaining a
consent to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment for a patient
who is incompetent, has a terminal or irreversible condition, has not exe-
cuted a directive, does not have a guardian, and has no available relatives
who may, under the statute,86 consent to the discontinuation of aggressive
care. The Natural Death Act required that such a treatment decision be
"witnessed" by another physician who was not involved in the treatment
of the patient.8 7 The Advance Directive Act continues that rule (with the
modification that the second physician must "concur" in the treatment
decision) and adds that concurrence may also be obtained from a physi-
cian-representative of the institutional ethics (or other medical)
committee.88
The Advance Directives Act provides that a directive to physicians ex-
ecuted before the effective date of the Act (September 1, 1999) remains
in effect and is governed by the Natural Death Act in effect at the time
the directive was executed, rather than by the new law. 89 This provision
continues the years-old trend of including a savings clause in amendments
to the Natural Death Act. Unfortunately, it creates the serious potential
for confusion as to the declarant's actual wishes as it assumes that law-
yers, their clients, and health care providers across the state will be able
to keep the nuances of the Advance Directives Act and the various incar-
nations of the Natural Death Act straight. In the real world, of course,
that simply won't happen. Accordingly, it is in everyone's interests that
directives be re-executed on forms that reflect the new law.
The advance directive formerly known as the "Durable Power of At-
torney for Health Care" has a new name: the "Medical Power of Attor-
ney."90 In most other respects, however, the medical power of attorney
resembles its predecessor, with certain exceptions noted below.91
and that the medical record should reflect that judgment, should not have to choose be-
tween his or her conscience and the prohibition of the law.
84. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 166.046(e).
85. See id. § 166.045(c).
86. See id. § 166.039(b).
87. See id. § 672.009(e) (West Supp. 1999).
88. See id. § 166.039(e) (West Supp. 2000).
89. See S.B. 1260, 76th Leg., ch. 450, § 3.02(a) (Tex. 1999).
90. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 166.002(11) (West Supp. 2000).
91. There exists the same potential for disagreement between an agent with a medical
power of attorney and a physician as there is between any surrogate decision maker and a
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The Advance Directives Act also amends the former out-of-hospital
DNR (Do Not Resuscitate) law in a number of significant ways. First, an
individual no longer needs to be diagnosed with a terminal condition in
order to execute an out-of-hospital DNR order. 92 This greatly expands
the class of patients who may execute this directive. Any competent
adult may execute this advance directive, although it still requires the sig-
nature of an attending physician to be effective. 93
Second, the out-of-hospital DNR has always been limited to out-of-
hospital locations. The prior law specified that the out-of-hospital setting
included "long-term care facilities, in-patient hospice facilities, private
homes, and vehicles during transport. '94 In practice, this list created con-
fusion as to the status of other locations within a hospital, including the
emergency department and outpatient departments, as well as physicians'
offices. The Advance Directive Act eliminates the confusion by adding
all three venues to the definition of "out-of-hospital settings. '95
Finally, the new law permits resuscitation to be withheld when a person
has an identification bracelet or an original out-of-hospital DNR order, as
did the prior law, but it also permits resuscitation to be withheld on the
basis of a photocopy of the out-of-hospital DNR order. 96 The new law
also eliminates the legal immunity provisions that formerly applied when
a responding health care professional knew of the existence of a valid
out-of-hospital DNR order and failed to effectuate it.97
II. PHYSICIANS
A. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
Often out-gunned in their negotiations with managed care organiza-
tions, physicians have started to fight back. On June 23, 1999, for exam-
ple, the AMA House of Delegates voted to approve the formation of a
union to facilitate collective bargaining between health insurers and two
physician. The Advance Directives Act therefore specifies that the same procedures pro-
vided for treatment disputes in §§ 166.045 and 166.046 should be followed when the agent
is acting pursuant to a medical power of attorney. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 166.158(c) (West Supp. 2000).
Another change applies when the agent is the spouse of the principal (the patient).
Under the old law, the durable power of attorney for health care would be automatically
revoked if the couple divorced. See TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 135.005(a)(3) (1997).
The Advance Directives Act adds that the medical power of attorney may provide that it is
to remain in effect even if the principal and the agent become divorced. See TEX. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE § 166.155(a)(3) (West Supp. 2000).
92. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY COE § 166.082(a) (West Supp. 2000).
93. See id. § 166.082(b).
94. See id. § 674.001(1.5) (West Supp. 1999).
95. See id. § 166.081(7) (West Supp. 2000).
96. See id. § 166.083(d). The Advance Directives Act states that a photocopy of the
out-of-hospital DNR form may be used "for any purpose for which the original written
order may be used .... " Id. § 166.083(d). This may create confusion as to whether the
"original" of the order can be executed by the patient and physician on a photocopy of the
original blank form. The answer should be "no," or else the word "written" in the phrase
"the original written order" has no meaning.
97. See id. § 166.095(b).
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types of physicians-medical residents and salaried employees. 98 The
House of Delegates also resolved to support legislative efforts to extend
protection from the antitrust laws to self-employed physicians.
The AMA's action addresses a fundamental problem confronting phy-
sicians who want to band together in their negotiations with health care
payers. Although union organizations and union members acting within
the legitimate objectives of the union are exempt from the antitrust
laws,99 the exemption extends only to collective bargaining by employees,
not independent contractors,1 00 with their employers. Texas, like a num-
ber of other states, observes a quite robust corporate-practice prohibition
that makes it difficult for most physicians, other than house staff, to be
employees. Moreover, the joint negotiations covered by the antitrust ex-
emption are between physicians and third-party payers. Thus, even if
Texas physicians were free to be employees, negotiations with health
plans would not qualify for the antitrust exemption afforded labor organi-
zations in their negotiations with employers.
One approach to the antitrust problem is to take advantage of the
"state action" exception to the federal antitrust laws, as initially articu-
lated by the United States Supreme Court in Parker v. Brown.1° 1 Al-
though initially formulated in terms of the antitrust exemption enjoyed
by state governments and their political subdivisions, "state action" has
subsequently been expanded to include the anticompetitive conduct of
private parties. To obtain the protection of the state-action doctrine, a
private action must meet two tests. First, the action must be taken pursu-
ant to a clearly stated state policy to exclude the activity from application
of the antitrust laws,' 0 2 and, second, the activity must be "actively super-
vised" by the state.10 3 "Active supervision" requires not only that there
be a structure for state involvement, but that the state act in fact, and it
must act as more than a rubber stamp for private anticompetitive con-
duct. The "active state supervision" requirement may include not only
supervision of a proposed transaction but continuing supervision and
monitoring during the course of the private parties' conduct. 0 4
98. See Steven Greenhouse, A.M.A.'s Delegates Vote to Unionize, N.Y. TIMES, June 24,
1999, at Al.
99. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1994) (§ 6 of the Clayton Act).
100. See Columbia River Packers Ass'n v. Hinton, 315 U.S. 143 (1942).
101. 317 u.s. 341 (1943).
102. Although the Texas legislature could hardly have been clearer about its intention
to displace market forces, this prong of the state action doctrine can be a stumbling block.
See, e.g., Surgical Care Ctr. of Hammond, L.C. v. Hospital Serv. Dist. No. 1 of Tangipahoa
Parish, 171 F.3d 231 (5th Cir. 1999).
103. See FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621 (1992); Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94
(1988); California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97
(1980).
104. See North Carolina ex rel. Edmisten v. P.I.A. Ashville, Inc., 740 F.2d 274 (4th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1003 (1985) (involving state certificate of need program). In
other contexts, so-called "non-commercial" activities (e.g., baseball) have been considered
exempt from antitrust laws as not falling within the meaning of "trade or commerce," even
though no one would deny that professional baseball involves exchanges of services and
products for money. See Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of
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With the requirements of the state-action doctrine clearly in mind, the
761h Legislature added a new chapter 29, entitled "Joint Negotiation by
Physicians with Health Benefit Plans," to the Texas Insurance Code. The
new law is premised upon certain stated findings, including that joint ne-
gotiation, if not accompanied by actual or threatened refusal to provide
patient care, will result in pro-competitive effects, and that there are in-
stances in which health plans dominate the market to such a degree that
fair negotiations between physicians and plans are otherwise unobtain-
able. The Texas statute is an attempt to address this alleged imbalance in
a way that will fit within the "state action" exemption from liability under
federal antitrust laws.
The essential elements of the statute are: (1) competing physicians who
comprise not more than 10 percent of the physicians in a health plan's
service area10 5 may jointly negotiate non-price terms of a contract; 10 6 (2)
competing physicians may jointly negotiate pricing terms if the health
Prof'l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922); Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972). On this
point, it is worth considering the American Medical Association's view that physicians are
not driven by profits or financial considerations but are governed entirely by ethical values
"'every step of the way."' Linda Chavez, Behind the AMA Label, WASH. TIMES, July 1,
1999, at A17 (quoting Dr. Randolph D. Somak, Jr., AMA Chairman). The AMA's argu-
ment is unlikely to get physicians an across-the-board exemption from the antitrust laws.
The Supreme Court rejected an exemption for the "learned professions" in Goldfarb v.
Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), and has been consistently rejected every time the
argument for such an exemption has been proferred, see, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa County
Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
105. See TEX. INS. CODE art. 29.09(b) (West Supp 2000). "Competing physicians within
the service area of a health benefit plan" may jointly negotiate within the limits set by the
statute, see id. art. 29.04, provided they constitute ten percent or less of the physicians in
the service area, although that percentage is subject to adjustment by the Texas Attorney
General. See id. art. 29.09(b). The ten percent limitation does not apply to the universe of
competing physicians but to the universe of all physicians in the service area. There is no
definition of "physician" in the new law, but elsewhere in the Insurance Code the term
variously means an individual licensed by the State Board of Medical Examiners or, more
broadly, an individual licensed to practice medicine in Texas, a professional association
organized under the Texas Professional Association Act, a non-profit health corporation
certified under section 5.01 of the Texas Medical Practice Act, a medical school as contem-
plated under the Education Code, or another person wholly owned by physicians. Com-
pare TEx. INs. CODE art. 20.01, with id. art. 20A.02(r). (The former definition would not
include doctors of osteopathy, while the latter would.) The phrase "competing physicians"
is not defined but presumably refers to physicians in the same specialties or in specialties
that have overlapping practices. A health plan's service area will be a matter of public
record in connection with its obtaining a certificate of authority under the Texas Insurance
Code.
106. See id. art. 29.04. The statute provides a list of sixteen terms and conditions of
contracts with health plans with respect to which physicians may jointly negotiate. These
non-price items include:
'(1) practices and procedures to assess and improve the delivery of effec-
tive, cost-efficient preventive health care services, including childhood
immunizations, prenatal care, and mammograms and other cancer
screening tests or procedures;
(2) practices and procedures to encourage early detection and effective,
cost-efficient management of diseases and illnesses in children;
(3) practices and procedures to assess and improve the delivery of wo-
men's medical and health care, including menopause and osteoporosis;
(4) clinical criteria for effective, cost-efficient disease management pro-
grams, including diabetes, asthma, and cardiovascular disease;
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benefit plan has substantial market power, as found by the Texas Attor-
ney General, and the pricing terms "have already affected or threatened
to adversely affect the quality and availability of patient care";' 0 7 (3) joint
negotiations shall be conducted through a representative.' 0 8 The physi-
cian representative will often need to provide the necessary information
through a series of filings, as facts and circumstances change. For exam-
ple, as physicians enter and depart from the jointly negotiating group, the
(5) practices and procedures to encourage and promote patient education
and treatment compliance, including parental involvement with their
children's health care;
(6) practices and procedures to identify, correct, and prevent potentially
fraudulent activities;
(7) practices and procedures for the effective, cost-efficient use of outpa-
tient surgery;
(8) clinical practice guidelines and coverage criteria;
(9) administrative procedures, including methods and timing of physician
payment for services;
(10) dispute resolution procedures relating to disputes between health ben-
efit plans and physicians;
(11) patient referral procedures;
(12) formulation and application of physician reimbursement methodology;
(13) quality assurance programs;
(14) health service utilization review procedures;
(15) health benefit plan physician selection and termination criteria; and
(16) the inclusion or alteration of terms and conditions to the extent they
are the subject of government regulation prohibiting or requiring the
particular term or condition in question; provided, however, that such
restriction does not limit physician rights to jointly petition government
for a change in such regulation.'
Id. art. 29.04(1)-(16). These areas of permissible joint negotiation purportedly address
non-price factors. With the possible exception of the inclusion of reimbursement method-
ology, it is unlikely that joint communications on any of these issues would prompt anti-
trust enforcement action. Interestingly, the list does not include some non-price factors
that are often cited as important to physicians, such as coverage decisions. It is also not
clear how the legislature can be sure that joint negotiation on these listed points will not be
used as a proxy for joint negotiation as to pricing matters.
107. Id. art. 29.06(a). The statute requires the Attorney General to "make the determi-
nation of what constitutes substantial market power," but curiously fails to require the
Attorney General to make the determination on the second factor. Id. The statute also
provides no guidance to the Attorney General as to the standards for determining whether
substantial market power exists.
108. See id. art. 29.07(3). Before acting as a representative under this statute, the repre-
sentative is required to submit to the Attorney General a report that provides information
concerning (i) the representative and the represented physicians, (ii) the relationship of the
physicians requesting joint representation to the total population of physicians in a geo-
graphic service area, (iii) health plans with which the representative intends to negotiate,
(iv) the projected subject matter of the negotiations, (v) the representative's plan of opera-
tion and procedures to ensure compliance with this applicable section, (vi) the expected
impact of the negotiations on the quality of patient care, and (vii) the benefits of the con-
tract between the health plan and physicians. See id. art. 29.08(1)(A)-(H).
If the representative, acting on behalf of the physicians, and the health plan reach agree-
ment, the physicians' representative is required furnish to the Texas Attorney General a
copy of the proposed contract and the above-referenced plan of action. See id. art.
29.08(2). In the event that a health plan declines to negotiate or terminates negotiations,
or simply fails to respond, the representative is required to report that fact to the Attorney
General and the filing regarding those negotiations is terminated, subject to renewal if




physicians' representative will presumably be able to supplement its prior
filing. The representative can be one of the involved physicians. who
must register with the Texas Attorney General; 10 9 An approval of the
initial filing by the Attorney General is effective for all subsequent nego-
tiations between the parties specified under the initial filing. The statute
makes no distinctions between initial filings and supplemental filings, so
the Attorney General presumably will have to approve or disapprove
supplemental filings as well. and (4) the jointly negotiated contract, if
any, must be approved by the Attorney General.110 The statute applies
only to health benefit plans and does not apply to employers. The statute
also does not apply to certain specialty coverage plans such as a specific
disease or limited-benefit coverage, to certain supplemental health insur-
ance plans that do not pay for physician services (specifically, dental or
vision care, coverage for hospital expenses or hospital confinement), to
workers' compensation coverage, or to a long-term care policy (unless the
policy is so comprehensive that the Attorney General finds that the
should be deemed to be a health benefit plan).11'"
Jointly negotiating physicians are not authorized "to jointly coordinate
any cessation, reduction, or limitation of health care services."112 Since
the physicians' refusal to provide services if their price or other demands
are not met is a necessary consequence of failing to reach agreement with
a health plan, the precise impact of this provision is unclear. The physi-
cians are not permitted to require participation in all products within a
health care plan as a condition to participation in any particular prod-
uct.113 Finally, the physicians may not negotiate to exclude non-physician
providers. In effect, non-physician providers (which are the subject of
other state laws that prohibit health plans from discriminating on the ba-
sis of licensure) will obtain some benefit from the negotiations by the
109. See id. art. 29.08. The Attorney General is required to approve or disapprove a
filing or a contract within 30 days. See id. art. 29.09(a). If the Attorney General does not
meet the deadline for approval or disapproval, an applicant can petition a state district
court in Travis County, Texas, for an order requiring the Attorney General to act. See id.
art. 29.09(d).
If the Attorney General disapproves a contract, the Attorney General must furnish a
written explanation of deficiency together with a statement of remedial measures as to how
deficiencies could be corrected. See id. art. 29.09(a). The Attorney General is required to
approve a request if the Attorney General finds that the benefits resulting from the joint
negotiation or proposed contract outweigh the disadvantages attributable to a reduction in
competition, specifically taking into account the distribution of physicians by specialty. See
id. art. 29.09(b).
110. See id. arts. 29.08(2), 29.09(a).
11. See id. art. 29.03(b).
112. See id. art. 29.10.
113. Id. This provision is an interesting twist on the usual scenario in which physicians
withdraw from plans that had required them to participate in all products. Under the new
law, it would presumably be futile for a health plan to attempt to get jointly negotiating
physicians to agree to such a term, since the physicians would be prohibited from meeting
and discussing it. It is not clear from the statute, however, whether the legislature thought




Both the Texas Attorney General and the Insurance Commissioner
have the authority to promulgate rules to implement this new chapter of
the Insurance Code. 115
B. DuTy TO WARN
In Thapar v. Zezulka,116 Freddy Ray Lilly had a history of mental
health problems and was treated by Dr. Thapar, a psychiatrist. Thapar
treated Lilly for several years, both on an inpatient and outpatient basis
for a variety of problems, including severe post-traumatic stress disorder,
alcohol abuse and paranoid and delusional beliefs concerning his stepfa-
ther, Henry Zezulka. In August of 1988, Lilly was admitted to the hospi-
tal and during that stay indicated to Thapar that he felt like killing Henry
Zezulka. After a seven-day inpatient treatment, Lilly was discharged and
within a month shot and killed Zezulka. Ms. Zezulka, Henry's wife and
Lilly's mother, sued Thapar for negligence resulting in her husband's
wrongful death. Ms. Zezulka claimed that Thapar was negligent in diag-
nosing and treating Lilly and in failing to warn of Lilly's threats toward
Henry Zezulka. 117
In the district court, Thapar moved for summary judgment on the
ground that Zezulka had not stated a claim for medical negligence be-
cause Thapar owed no duty to Zezulka in the absence of a doctor-patient
relationship. The trial court granted summary judgment for Thapar
based on the Supreme Court's decision in Bird v. W.C.W., 118 which held
that a psychologist owes no duty to a third party to nonnegligently diag-
nose a patient's condition. The Court of Appeals held that the no-duty
ground asserted in Thapar's motion for summary judgment was a defense
to the cause of action pleaded by Zezulka.
The Supreme Court reviewed the issue and determined that a mental
health professional has no duty to a third party non-patient for negligent
misdiagnosis or negligent treatment.119 This holding was consistent with
Bird and the post-Bird holdings of the Supreme Court on related issues.
The Supreme Court also determined that, in Texas, a mental health pro-
fessional owes no duty to identifiable third parties to warn them of a pa-
114. "Non-physician health care provider" would include, for example, chiropractors,
doctors of osteopathy, and podiatrists. Under the statute, the Attorney General and the
Commissioner of Insurance may by rule authorize podiatrists to participate in the joint
negotiations permitted by this chapter. See id. art. 29.11. On June 2, 2000, the Attorney
General proposed a rule that would clarify that podiatrists may participate in joint negotia-
tions without joining in with physicians. See Proposed Rule, Chapter 58, Physician Joint
Negotiation, 25 Tex. Reg. 4977 (2000).
115. See TEX. INS. CODE art. 29.11 (West Supp. 2000). On June 2, 2000, the Attorney
General promulgated final rules. See Adopted Rule, Chapter 58, Physician Joint Negotia-
tion, 25 Tex. Reg. 5324 (2000).
116. 994 S.W.2d 635 (Tex. 1999).
117. See id. at 636.
118. 868 S.W.2d 767 (Tex. 1994).
119. Thapar, 994 S.W.2d at 638.
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tient's specific threats. This duty has never been recognized in Texas
despite the holding in Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California,120 in
which the California courts recognized a cause of action against a mental
health professional for failing to warn third parties of a patient's threats.
The Texas Supreme Court stated that the Legislature has chosen to
closely guard patient communications with mental health professionals
through a statute governing the disclosure of communications during the
course of mental health treatment. 12' This statute classifies communica-
tions between mental health professionals and their patients as confiden-
tial and prohibits disclosure to third parties unless an exception applies.
While there is an exception for disclosure to medical or law enforcement
personnel where the professional determines there is a probability of im-
minent physical injury by the patient to himself or others, or where there
is a probability of immediate mental or emotional injury to the patient,
this exception is permissive rather than mandatory. The Supreme Court
refused to impose a duty that it considers to be in contradiction to legisla-
tive enactments evidencing the adoption of a public policy against disclo-
sure of mental-health-professional/patient communications.1 22
III. LIABILITY
A. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT
In MacGregor Medical Association v. Campbell,123 Mr. Campbell be-
came violently ill after ingesting a drink containing formaldehyde at his
office. He was immediately taken to the MacGregor Clinic and treated
by Dr. Berlin who failed to pump his stomach, perform blood tests to
determine the level of formaldehyde contamination in his body, or treat
him with activated charcoal. Subsequently, after eight months of continu-
ing problems, Mr. Campbell underwent two unsuccessful stomach sur-
geries, resulting in the need to completely remove his stomach. Following
his death four and a half years after his initial visit with Dr. Berlin, Mr.
Campbell's wife sued the professional association of physicians who oper-
ated the clinic that treated her husband alleging negligence, Deceptive
Trade Practices Act violations, breach of contract, and breach of
warranty. 24
The clinic filed a motion for summary judgment alleging that the two-
year statute of limitations in article 4590(i) of the Insurance Code, the
Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act, barred the Camp-
bell's claim.' 25 The trial court granted the summary judgment for the
clinic. The court of appeals determined that although the limitations ap-
120. 551 P.2d 334, 345-47 (Cal. 1976).
121, TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 611.002 (1996).
122, Thapar, 994 S.W.2d at 639-40.
123. 985 S.W.2d 38 (Tex. 1998).
124, See id. at 39.
125. See id. at 39-40.
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plied and barred Campbell's negligence claim, it did not bar her DTPA,
breach of contract, or breach of warranty claims.
On appeal, the Texas Supreme Court stated that the article 4590(i) lim-
itations protection applied to professional associations of physicians as
well as individual physicians,126 and it determined that Campbell's claims
of breach of contract and breach of warranty were barred by those limita-
tions. In language that sweeps even more broadly, the court stated that a
negligence claim could not be recast as a DTPA claim to avoid the stan-
dards set forth in Article 4590(i). The court further distinguished Camp-
bell's DTPA claim from that of the plaintiff in Sorokolit v. Rhodes,127
which allowed a DTPA claim against a physician when the doctor guaran-
teed that, following breast surgery the patient's breasts would look like a
picture she had selected. The court said that Dr. Sorokolit "knowingly
breached his express warranty of a particular result and knowingly mis-
represented his skills and the results he could achieve" which gave rise to
a DTPA claim. 128 Ms. Campbell's claim was based on representations
regarding the clinic's ability to provide qualified personnel and resources
for medical treatment, which are more akin to claims regarding quality of
medical care than claims in which a doctor specifically guarantees and
warrants a particular result. Accordingly, the court concluded that "Arti-
cle 4590i, Sorokolit, and its progeny prohibit the assertion of this DTPA
claim."' 29
B. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
In Earle v. Ratliff,130 Michael Ratliff, a 38-year-old freight handler who
injured his back on the job, was treated and operated on in November
1991 by Dr. Earle, who performed various surgical procedures including
the insertion of a metal bone plate and pin screws. After the surgery
Ratliff's condition continued to decline. In November 1993 Dr. Earle op-
erated again to remove and replace the devices he had implanted in the
first surgery. Ratliff's condition declined even further, leaving him una-
ble to walk, talk or care for himself. Ratliff then sued Dr. Earle for: neg-
ligence, fraudulent concealment, strict liability and violations of the
DTPA.13 1
Dr. Earle moved for summary judgment on several grounds, including
that Ratliff's claims relating to his 1991 surgery were barred by limita-
tions, that Earle did not breach the standard of care owed to Ratliff in the
second surgery in 1993, and that Dr. Earle had obtained from Ratliff the
consent to treatment and surgery required by statute.132 Finally, Dr.
Earle also argued that Ratliff's healthcare liability claims could not be
126. See id. at 40.
127. 889 S.W.2d 239 (Tex. 1994).
128. MacGregor Med. Ass'n, 985 S.W.2d at 40 (quoting Sorokolit, 889 S.W.2d at 242).
129. Id. at 40-41 (emphasis added).
130. 998 S.W.2d 882 (Tex. 1999).
131. See id. at 884.
132. See id. at 885.
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recast as DTPA violations. Although the court of appeals found it diffi-
cult to ascertain when the limitations period began because the case in-
cluded elements of both misdiagnosis and mistreatment, the court found
that under the circumstances the limitations period did not begin to run
on Ratliff's claim until the date of Earle's last treatment, which was less
than two months before Ratliff filed his lawsuit. 33 Upon review, the su-
preme court found that because Ratliff did not allege that Dr. Earle mis-
diagnosed or mistreated his condition after surgery, the limitations period
began to run on Ratliff's complaint concerning the 1991 surgery on the
date the surgery was performed. 134 The Supreme Court also Ratliff's
Open Courts argument because Ratliff had ample opportunity to learn of
any negligence by Dr. Earle in performing his 1991 surgery and "the fact
that he waited more than two years to do so does not [extend the limita-
tion period or] raise constitutional concerns."1 35
Regarding claims for Dr. Earle's alleged negligence and failure to dis-
close the risks associated with the 1993 surgery, the Supreme Court held
that the claim is governed by the Medical Liability Insurance Improve-
ment Act' 36 and that if a physician makes disclosures as required by the
panel created by that act which determines what risks should be disclosed
for a given procedure, then the physician cannot later be found negligent
for not disclosing other risks and hazards associated with the procedure.
Thus, because Ratliff produced no evidence that his written consent was
ineffective due to incapacity or was otherwise invalid, he raised no issue
that Dr. Earle was negligent in disclosing the risk of surgery. 37
C. HOSPITALS
In NME Hospitals, Inc. v. Rennels,138 the Texas Supreme Court held in
a case of first impression that "a plaintiff may ... maintain standing to
sue under the Texas [Commission on Human Rights] Act
[("TCHRA") 139] in the absence of a direct employment relationship with
the defendant"'140 as long as the plaintiff can show that the defendant
interfered with plaintiff's employment relationship.
Dr. Margaret Rennels was employed as a pathologist for Sierra Labo-
ratory Associates ("Sierra"). Sierra Medical Center ("the Hospital") was
Sierra's primary client. Under its "Pathology Agreement" with the Hos-
pital, Sierra had the exclusive right to set up the Hospital's pathology
department and to perform all pathology work for the Hospital.14 Sierra
terminated Dr. Rennels on September 9, 1993, citing difficulties between
133. Id.
134. See id. at 886.
135. Id. at 890.
136. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art 4590i, § 6.01-.08 (Vernon Supp. 1999).
137. See Earle, 998 S.W.2d at 892.
138. 994 S.W.2d 142 (Tex. 1999).
139. TEX. LA1BOR CODE § 21.055 (West Supp. 1999).
140. 994 S.W.2d at 146.
141. See id. at 143.
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Dr. Rennels and another associate pathologist. Dr. Rennels alleged that
the termination constituted sex discrimination. 142
Dr. Rennels returned to work later that year, and in early 1994, Sierra
informed her by letter that she would be made a shareholder once the
necessary paperwork was completed. On April 4, 1994, however, Dr.
Rennels overheard a conversation between the Hospital's chief executive
officer and a Sierra shareholder concerning their desire to prevent Dr.
Rennels from becoming a shareholder. Sierra's attorney later informed
Dr. Rennels that she would not be made a shareholder, and that Dr. Ren-
nels could continue her employment as a salaried associate only if she
signed a release. Dr. Rennels then filed a discrimination claim with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, was terminated by Sierra
on May 25, 1994, and sued the Hospital for retaliatory discharge and con-
spiracy under the THRCA.143
The Hospital moved for summary judgment on the ground that Ren-
nels lacked standing to sue the Hospital under the THRCA in the ab-
sence of a direct employment relationship between Rennels and the
Hospital, and that because she did not have standing to sue under the
THRCA she lacked standing to bring the conspiracy claim The trial court
granted summary judgment in favor of the Hospital on both claims. 144
The court of appeals reversed the summary judgment and remanded the
case to the trial court.1 45
Affirming the court of appeals judgment, the Texas Supreme Court
concluded that the THRCA is modeled after federal civil rights law to the
extent that it purports to correlate "state law with federal law in the area
of discrimination in employment."1 46 In doing so, it looked to the deci-
sions of many courts that have held that while a Title VII plaintiff must
show an employment relationship to sue under Title VII, a direct employ-
ment relationship between a plaintiff and defendant is not necessary, so
long as the plaintiff can show that the defendant-employer controlled ac-
cess to the plaintiff's employment opportunities and denied or interfered
with that access based on unlawful criteria.147 In order to harmonize fed-
eral and state common law, the court concluded that a plaintiff may like-
wise maintain standing under the THRCA in the absence of a direct
employment relationship with the defendant. Furthermore, the THRCA
does not expressly require an employment relationship between the em-
ployer who violates the statute and the "person"-not the "employee"-
who is harmed by the violation.148 Relying on the express wording of the
Act, and construing the remedial statute liberally and in conformity with
analogous federal precedent, the court therefore recognized that the Act
142. See id.
143. See id. at 144.
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. Id. (quoting Schroeder v. Texas Iron Works, Inc., 813 S.W.2d 483, 485 (Tex. 1991).




affords a claim to people who do not stand in a direct employment rela-
tionship with the defendant-employer. 149
In St. Joseph Hospital v. Wolff,150 an allegedly negligent resident/sur-
geon was employed by a foundation in Austin instituted by St. Joseph to
give its residents "extensive experience in general surgery."'151 The case
against St. Joseph was initiated after the resident failed to notify the chief
surgeon that one of his patients was losing a significant amount of blood
following a tracheostomy. The patient suffered brain damage as a result
of the blood loss and the medical-malpractice claim followed. At trial,
the jury found the resident's conduct to be negligent and awarded dam-
ages against St. Joseph.' 52
On appeal, St. Joseph challenged the district court's jury instruction
regarding "joint enterprise" as well as the jury's finding that the hospital
was engaged in a joint enterprise with the foundation. In addition, St.
Joseph alleged that it owed no duty to the patient and that an instruction
should have been given regarding the borrowed servant doctrine. The
court of appeals rejected all points raised by the hospital. 153 As to the
joint enterprise instruction, the court of appeals held that the district
court properly defined a joint enterprise as requiring a "common business
or pecuniary interest. 1 54 The court continued by finding that this re-
quirement (as well as the common purpose requirement) was met
through evidence that St. Joseph and the foundation shared a "mutual
desire to provide extensive training through patient care" as well as the
"financial benefits and costs" of the program.155As to the remaining ele-
ment of an integrated enterprise - that the parties have an equal right to
direct and control the enterprise - the court cited the fact that St. Joseph
maintained control over residents and consulted in the academic aspects
of the program as evidence that the requirement was met.' 56
In finding a joint enterprise, the court of appeals rejected the remain-
ing issues on appeal. The court first explained that St. Joseph's argument
that it owed no duty to the patient was irrelevant in light of the joint
enterprise finding. Put another way, St. Joseph's liability for negligence
was established through the foundation and thus there was no need for a
direct relationship between the hospital and patient. 157 Similarly, the
court held that arguments regarding a borrowed servant instruction were
immaterial once a joint enterprise was found. 158
149. See id. at 147.
150. 999 S.W.2d 579 (Tex. App.-Austin 1999, no pet.).
151. Id. at 583.
152. See id.
153. See id. at 584.
154. Id. at 586-87.
155. Id. at 587.
156. See id. at 589-90.
157. See id. at 591-92.
158. See id. at 592.
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IV. HEALTH INSURANCE: THIRD-PARTY ADMINISTRATION
In Toranto v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Texas, Inc.,1 59 a patient had
assigned her health insurance benefits to her physician. Blue Cross and
Blue Shield ("Blue Cross"), acting as a third-party claims administrator
for her insurance plan, nonetheless paid the patient directly and refused
to pay her out-of-network physician because the health plan's documents
contained an anti-assignment clause. Although the Texas Insurance code
broadly prohibits insurers from including anti-assignment provisions in
their policies,1 60 Blue Cross successfully argued in the lower court that
the Insurance Code prohibition did not apply to a third-party administra-
tor because it was not an "insurer.' 161
The Texas Supreme Court reversed. The court reasoned that when a
third party is acting as the claims administrator for an insurer, such a
third party is an insurer because it is authorized to act as the insurer's
claims administrator under Chapter 3 of the Texas Insurance code. Be-
cause the anti-assignment clause in the plan documents violates the Texas
Insurance Code, Blue Cross as an insurer is subject to and must comply
with the Insurance Code's anti-assignment prohibition. 162
159. 993 S.W.2d 648 (Tex. 1999).
160. TEx. INS. CODE art. 21.24-1, § 3(a) (1998), provides: "An insurer may not deliver,
renew, or issue for delivery a health insurance policy in this state that prohibits or restricts
the written assignment by a covered person of benefits provided by the policy for health
care services to the physician or other health care provider that furnishes those health care
services to the covered person."
161. Id. art. 21.24-1, § 1(6) (Vernon 1998), defines "insurer" as "an insurance company,
association, or organization authorized to do business in this state under Chapter 3 ... of
this Code."
162. See Toranto, 993 S.W.2d at 649.
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